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Christian Kirchner was an unusual scholar and teacher in many ways.
He started his career with two unconventional topics that would normally
be chosen much later. For his legal dissertations at Harvard and Frankfurt
he chose international cartels.1 For his economic dissertation he selected
international accounting.2 In a sense, he “inherited” these two topics from
another unusual teacher, Heinrich Kronstein. But he was Christian Kirch-
ner, and hence he treated them in a distinct “Kirchnerian” way, a specific
and unique mix of functional legal and economic analysis.
Christian was working on these two problems when I met him again in
Frankfurt after his return from Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1973. I had
been there a couple of years before him and had been involved mainly in
problems of contracting and corporate law. These were much more conven-
tional topics for an academic interested in comparative law. In this situation
we were both looking for further topics, and we decided to explore jointly
law and economics,3 and particularly, the law and policy of international
* Professor emeritus and former managing director, Institute for Comparative Law,
Philipps Universita¨t Marburg, Germany; permanent guest professor for law and economics,
Faculty of Law, Universitetet i Bergen, Norway.
This lecture was given in memory of Christian Kirchner at the University of St. Thomas
School of Law, Minneapolis, Minnesota, on September 6, 2014. The lecture form has been main-
tained. Footnotes have been added parsimoniously. My thanks to Wulf Kaal and the members of
the University of St. Thomas Law Journal who kindly organized the memorial symposium and
provided diligent editorial assistance.
1. CHRISTIAN KIRCHNER, INTERNATIONALE MARKTAUFTEILUNGEN [INTERNATIONAL MARKET
SHARING] (1975). The unpublished Harvard thesis of 1972 was written under the supervision of
Donald Turner and Richard Caves.
2. CHRISTIAN KIRCHNER, WELTBILANZEN [GLOBALLY CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATE-
MENTS] (1978).
3. CHRISTIAN KIRCHNER, ERICH SCHANZE & HEINZ-DIETER ASSMANN, ¨OKONOMISCHE ANA-
LYSE DES RECHTS [ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW] (2nd ed. 1993).
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mining agreements. We cooperated very closely for more than ten years and
co-published six books, supervising another handful.4
It is clear that mining agreements were, and indeed still are, operating
in a world of cartelization. But that was not the main aspect emphasized by
Christian. He stressed the importance of information and proper accounting
in these complex arrangements. At the symposium, Christine Windbichler
talked about the central role of accounting in corporate governance. I will
start here by emphasizing the vital role of accounting in contracting. Nor-
mal contract law seems to have nothing to do with accounting. In the sale of
a widget, accounting is a discreet matter, as irrelevant as the motivations of
the parties who sell and buy.
Things change dramatically once we investigate long-term relation-
ships between commercial parties. When I studied in the US in the late
sixties it looked as if the structure of production was dominated by large
companies, or rather groups of companies under common direction. You
may remember John Kenneth Galbraith (who lived up our street at Cam-
bridge) and who talked about “the technostructure,”5 or Alfred Chandler
who would picture production in terms of “managerial hierarchies.”6 If you
look at the production of our day, say of an automobile, a robot, advanced
computer hard- or software, or banking or law services, you will notice that
we produce complex goods and services in contractual networks between
legally independent firms. I understand the underlying legal structure as a
“symbiotic arrangement,” distinct from classical contract and corporate
law.7 In this class of intense long-term contractual relationships that domi-
nate current business interactions, trust, motivation, innovation, and, of
course, constant information flows and accounting are at the very core.
I. LESSONS FROM MINING AGREEMENTS
Why did we choose mining contracts in 1974? In late 1973, the Arab
members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
proclaimed an oil embargo, and the price of a barrel of oil rose from three
4. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN KIRCHNER, ERICH SCHANZE ET AL., MINING VENTURES IN DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES, PART 1: INTERESTS, BARGAINING PROCESS, LEGAL CONCEPTS (Kluwer, Studies in
Transnational Law of Natural Resources Ser. No. 1, 1979); ERICH SCHANZE, CHRISTIAN KIRCHNER
ET AL., MINING VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, PART 2: ANALYSIS OF PROJECT AGREE-
MENTS (Kluwer, Studies in Transnational Law of Natural Resources Ser. No. 2, 1981). A summary
of issues is found in the final volume, G ¨UNTHER JAENICKE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL MINING INVEST-
MENT: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, (Kluwer, Studies in Transnational Law of Natural
Resources Ser. No. 11, 1988); see also Erich Schanze, Regulation by Consensus: The Practice of
International Investment Agreements, 144 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 152 (1988).
5. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967).
6. ALFRED D. CHANDLER. JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
7. Erich Schanze, Symbiotic Arrangements, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECO-
NOMICS AND THE LAW 554–59 (Peter Newman ed. 1998).
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dollars to nearly twelve dollars.8 The Western economies were severely af-
fected. Everybody talked about oil. Studies of oil contracts mushroomed.
Our institute at Frankfurt had contact with Metallgesellschaft, at that time
the most important German metal trading house. We also were in touch
with David Smith and Louis Wells at Harvard who were consulting in the
area of third-world mining.9 It was clear that the supply of many metal ores
and related semi-finished products was of critical importance for the Ger-
man industry. Instead of looking at oil, we decided to do an industry study
of hard mineral mining in developing countries. We collected data about the
industry, specifically master agreements of mining projects and related doc-
uments. Financed by the German Academic Research Council, we formed a
working group and in a period of five years were able to obtain a fairly
comprehensive global picture of the existing projects and practices.10
Open-pit metal mining projects are among the largest and most contro-
versial industrial projects. The investments are immense. In many cases a
complete infrastructure has to be built from scratch. The related legal docu-
ments need many shelves. The Frankfurt group published eleven volumes
containing our analyses. In the Festschrift, a collection of writings in mem-
ory of Christian Kirchner, I have reviewed some of our findings, evaluating
them from a research perspective after thirty years.11 Here, I will turn to the
question of what we could learn from the study of mining agreements for
teaching. The Frankfurt project on “Mining Agreements in Developing
Countries” is not just an icon in empirical legal research of the past.12 For
the present, it is a most stimulating base for understanding and especially
teaching complex contracting in an international setting.
It is by historical coincidence that the modern neo-institutional theory
of long-term contracting—associated in the US with the names of Lester
Telser,13 Oliver Hart,14 Oliver Williamson,15 Ron Gilson,16 Victor
8. 1973 Oil Crisis, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_oil_crisis (last visited
Nov. 30, 2015).
9. DAVID N. SMITH & LOUIS T. WELLS JR., NEGOTIATING THIRD WORLD MINERAL AGREE-
MENTS: PROMISES AS PROLOGUE (1975).
10. Hans-Joachim Mertens & Gerald Spindler, Internationales Rohstoffrecht: Bericht u¨ber
ein DFG-Forschungsprojekt [International Mineral Law: Report on a DFG research project], 53
RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT F ¨UR AUSL ¨ANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABEL JOURNAL
OF COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW] 526–50 (1989).
11. Erich Schanze, Internationales Rohstoffrecht [International Mineral Law], in FEST-
SCHRIFT ZU EHREN VON CHRISTIAN KIRCHNER [Writings in Honor of Christian Kirchner] 253–67
(Wulf A. Kaal, Matthias Schmidt & Andreas Schwartze eds. 2014).
12. See Richard M. Buxbaum, International Mining Projects as a Research Paradigm of
Transnational Economic Law, in JAENICKE ET AL., supra note 4, at 101–24.
13. Lester G. Telser, A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27, 27–44 (1980).
14. See OLIVER E. HART, FIRMS, CONTRACT, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995).
15. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLI-
CATIONS, ch. 5 (1975).
16. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,
94 YALE L.J. 239–313 (1984).
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Goldberg,17 Charles Goetz and Bob Scott,18 Alan Schwartz,19 and many
more—was developed during the time of our project.
II. SHIFTING THE PERSPECTIVE: LAW AS REMEDY OR LAW AS
PREVENTION OF CONFLICT
How would we merge the findings of an empirical study of “big deals”
with modern neo-institutional contract theory? This has been my research
and teaching agenda for twenty-five years.20 It resulted, among others, in a
course called “Complex Business Contracts.”21 It is not just a course on
sizable international business transactions that assembles the knowledge of
comparative law in that field. The course tries to shift the basic perspective
of contract law.
Standard contract law looks at contracting from a “remedial” perspec-
tive. A judge determines in a contract dispute whether there is a contract at
all, what is meant by the parties (content), or whether there was a failure of
performances. Remedies are granted, sometimes by resorting to “gap fill-
ing” and “default rules.”22 Rules and case law have been developed over the
centuries.
Complex contracting in business environments tries to operate by
avoiding court litigation. The example of mineral agreements is most in-
structive. These arrangements between host states and investors frequently
operate without, or with very limited access to, normal forms of litigation.
Hence, there is a need for changing the perspective. Lawyers are required to
make the law for the parties. They have to engage in a shift to a “caution-
ary” or “constructive” perspective—to dispute prevention by drafting incen-
tive-compatible contracts.
The theory of drafting workable arrangements starts with the notion
that conflict avoidance requires the planning of conflict channeling de-
vices.23 We will never live in a conflict-free world. But we can reduce con-
17. Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. 426–48
(1976).
18. Charles Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of
Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980).
19. Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979).
20. After teaching a short German drafting course at Oldenburg from 1988 until 1995, I
taught the English course at the University of Virginia in 2000; at Bond University in 2001; at the
University of St. Gallen in 2009; and at the University of Bergen regularly from 2006 until today.
21. I have prepared a couple of readers for the course, including Complex Business Contracts
(Erich Schanze ed. 2007) (course book, printed on demand, for Univ. of Bergen); and Structuring
International Business Transactions – Law and Economics (Erich Schanze ed. 2009) (course book,
printed on demand, for Univ. St. Gallen).
22. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
23. On the problem and the styles of managing tensions, see ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R.
PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS
AND DISPUTES 51–68 (2000).
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flict by employing matching institutions. The use of institutions is not
costless, but generally it is less costly than living in constant dispute. The
deeper problem is that human beings cannot predict the future. Our future is
uncertain. But we are able to transform a major portion of uncertainty, more
precisely “Knightean uncertainty” to “Knightean risk,” if we know the
odds.24 The required statistical analysis not only requires accumulated
knowledge of past events, but it is only feasible in a state of continuity, or in
other words, in a world of stable institutions such as property rights, reliable
contracting, compensation schemes, and their enforcement. Stable property
rights and reliable expectations from contracting enable us to make private
or business plans. Indeed, the wealth of our societies does not only depend
on the Smithean division of labor but even more on the possibility of tack-
ling the future by planning within a framework of stable institutions. The
key idea is: “He who sows must also be able to harvest.”
III. PLANNING TASKS
Drafting a complex business contract involves four planning tasks:
performance planning, risk planning, revision planning, and litigation
planning.
A. Performance Planning
The specification of performances requires an exchange of information
about the characteristics of the goods and services involved. In complex
agreements this is not merely a descriptive task of existing contractual ob-
jects. Think of a large industrial project like a mine, which also involves the
integration into the environment.25 A blueprint of the project has to be de-
veloped. The staging of tasks has to be arranged. The relationship between
potential contractors and subcontractors is to be considered. Drafting a min-
ing agreement like the Bougainville master agreement reflects not only the
standard phases of mining, like prospecting, exploration, and assessing and
building a project for exploitation, but also reflects a complete infrastruc-
ture including housing for workers and their families, a harbor, complicated
environmental concerns with roads and tailings reservoirs, and especially
the clearing of numerous anthropological questions in the broadest sense.26
Information and documentation is not just a matter of preparing the con-
24. FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921).
25. Linkages are a puzzling problem in mining investment in developing countries. The host
country may have classical state objectives like road building, education of skilled workers, and
health care, which may be side effects of a large industrial project like an iron ore mine. The
private project objectives, however, have to be aligned with the public interest in an optimal
allocation of infrastructural resources. For the localization of the workforce, see Martin Bartels,
Localization of Labor, in SCHANZE ET AL., MINING VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, PART 2,
supra note 4, at 198–211.
26. See Schanze, Regulation by Consensus, supra note 4, at 153–55.
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tract. An ongoing information process has to be organized. I will come back
to this shortly in the context of remembering Christian Kirchner’s key chap-
ter to the second volume of our study, under the heading of “Information
Disclosure.”27
B. Risk Planning
I have already mentioned the fundamental relevance of risk in contract,
and specifically its relation to Frank Knight’s insights on insurable risk and
the relevant institutional setting. In contract planning we are obviously con-
cerned with performance programs for the future, and performances are
contingent on many risks. True, there are risks in standard one-shot con-
tracting, mainly non-performance and quality risks. Once we move on to
complex long-term arrangements we are typically confronted with a chang-
ing environment over time. The legal rule of pacta sunt servanda does not
fully cope with this problem. In terms of risk analysis, it is a simple scheme
in that it leaves all contract risks where they lie. There is no doubt about the
expedience of such rules in simple one-shot transactions; however, long
futures also require the drafting of revision programs.28 I do not want to be
misunderstood at this point; I am not arguing against the rule of binding
contracts, and for allowing a manipulation of contracts by ad-hoc judicial
intervention. Rather, I am emphasizing taking future changes seriously by
treating them explicitly in a state-of-the art agreement.
C. Revision Planning
Mining agreements present a rich empirical background for under-
standing failures of drafting, but also for spotting viable mechanisms for
revision. One of the many lessons we learned was that it might be prudent
to include a “General Investment Plan” in the agreement.29 This part of the
contract would specify projections on the feasibility of the mining project,
including realistic scenarios based on discounted cash-flow analysis. The
explicit projections could then be used in a future adjustment of the terms of
the contract. There are numerous options for contract adaptation in practice.
There are mechanisms of stabilization, automatic adaptation, most-favored
clauses, and stipulations of procedures for adaptation and change which I
27. Christian Kirchner, Information Disclosure, in SCHANZE ET AL., MINING VENTURES IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, PART 2, supra note 4, at 69–106.
28. SMITH & WELLS, supra note 9, at 3, 121. A detailed study on contractual adaptation
mechanisms within our study project was provided in MARTIN BARTELS, CONTRACTUAL ADAPTA-
TION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION BASED ON VENTURE CONTRACTS FOR MINING PROJECTS IN DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES (Kluwer, Studies in Transnational Law of Natural Resources Ser. No. 8,
1985).
29. I have developed this idea in detail in ERICH SCHANZE, INVESTITIONSVERTR ¨AGE IM IN-
TERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [Investment Treaties in International Business Law] 161–83
(1986).
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cannot treat here in detail. Revision planning in mining contracts is treated
in a separate volume of our study.30
D. Litigation Planning and Conflict Screening
Revision planning is closely related to litigation planning. Let me turn
now to this last central planning aspect, coping with potential disputes be-
tween the parties. The standard approach would be to specify a court, be it a
national court or an arbitration panel, and to specify an applicable law.
In mining agreements there is a severe problem with selecting either a
host-state court or home-state court of the investor. The host state is typi-
cally a party to the contract, but the home-state court may be prejudiced
toward the investor. Given the fact that some of the applicable law gov-
erning the mining operation will be ius cogens of the host state, there will
be an unavoidable split of applicable law. The famous or infamous resort to
international arbitration employing a lex mercatoria31 of mining may be a
shot in the dark.
This means that litigation planning has to look for non-standard solu-
tions. During the analysis of mining agreements we developed an institu-
tional mechanism, which we termed “conflict screening.”32
Instead of formulating conditions of direct recourse to a classical court,
we suggested the use of “screens” or filters for settling disputes. We distin-
guished between “internal” and “external” screens. A first screen might be
an internal dispute resolution body within the board of directors or supervi-
sory board. Construction contracts contain routine clauses requiring the em-
ployment of an independent engineer if a dispute arises about technical
problems.33 We divided between accounting issues and technical matters
and devised a further screen of either in-house ad-hoc professional working
groups or external independent engineers or accountants for settling dis-
putes in their area of competence. We also installed a screen of conciliation
before, for example, a final board of arbitration would be employed. An
important aspect of conflict screening is, of course, the requirement of a
fixed and strictly enforceable timeline for each step. Otherwise the scheme
would be an invitation for strategic action by one of the parties. Moreover,
it should be clear that a complicated machinery of screens only makes sense
30. See BARTELS, CONTRACTUAL ADAPTATION, supra note 28.
31. Affirmative on the relevance of using a lex mercatoria, see KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE
CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE NEW LEX MERCATORIA (2nd ed. 2010).
32. Our first explicit use was in the context of drafting a hypothetical joint venture contract
for deep seabed mining. See G ¨UNTER JAENICKE, ERICH SCHANZE, & WOLFGANG HAUSER, A JOINT
VENTURE AGREEMENT FOR SEABED MINING, 22 (Kluwer, Studies in Transnational Law of Natural
Resources Ser. No. 5, 1981).
33. An important current application of the concept of conflict screening is found in the ICC
Model Turnkey Contract for Major Projects, articles 66 and 67, where disputes are initially re-
ferred to a “Combined Dispute Board.” See Int’l Chamber of Commerce [ICC], ICC Model Turn-
key Contract for Major Projects, ICC Doc. 460-16/56rev18 (2007 ed.).
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for very sizeable investment projects. I should mention at this point that
nobody was talking about Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) when we
developed these new concepts of dispute settlement.
IV. SELF-ENFORCING AGREEMENTS
In my view, one of the most enlightening theories in the field of com-
plex long-term contracting is Lester Telser’s concept of self-enforcing
agreements.34 His 1980 paper contains a neo-classical model that may be
shocking at first blush for neo-institutional economists, and for lawyers in
particular, because the paper contains algorithms galore and assumptions
that are far from reality.
The concept is simple. Assume two contracting parties who plan a co-
operation. There is no third party intervention, say by a court or equivalent.
The parties set the terms. There are no rules on violation. Both parties may
terminate the co-operation at will at any time in the future. The critical
point is a long time horizon. Even in the standard economic model, infor-
mation about the future is lacking. The calculation of the net present value
of the relationship for each party at every point in time leading to a breach
is incomplete, even in this fictitious world. The key question of the actors in
this model is contained in The Beatles’ line, “Will you still need me, will
you still feed me, when I’m sixty-four?”35 Assessing gains and losses in an
environment of uncertainty, risk-averse parties will avoid breaching, and
instead stay in their current relationship.
V. HOSTAGES, SEQUENCING, AND OTHER MECHANISMS
OF EXTRA-LEGAL ENFORCEMENT
The idea of self-enforcing agreements gets closer to reality if addi-
tional mechanisms are considered that play, in my view, a fundamental role
in practice. At the same time when we inspected the practice of mining
agreements and found mechanisms of self-enforcement, Oliver Williamson
developed the notion of hostages to secure exchange.36
Mining agreements and the related financial instruments are full of
bonding ideas and clauses. I remember the Liberian case where the German
development bank seized the crusher as their property.37 The crusher is lit-
erally the central machinery on a mine where the ore will be crushed for
getting on to the ball mills, and from there to the concentrator. In another
case, workbenches, the key machinery for production frequently remains in
34. Telser, supra note 13.
35. THE BEATLES, When I’m Sixty-Four, on SGT. PEPPER’S LONELY HEARTS CLUB BAND
(EMI Records, Ltd. 1967).
36. Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Secure Exchange, 73
AM. ECON. REV. 519–40 (1983).
37. Interview with Dr. Heinrich Harries, Board Member, Kreditanstalt fu¨r Wiederaufbau
[German Bank for Reconstruction & Development], Frankfurt am Main (March 28, 1979).
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the hands of the central agent. One-sided default clauses may work as hos-
tages. But there are also human hostages taken. We see numerous cases
where key personnel are exchanged between the parties, like princes and
princesses in medieval times.
A mechanism related to hostages is sequencing.38 It is a variation of
diversification in a timeline. Investors dissect the investment into stages or
phases. They promise to enter the next stage if, and only if, the host country
complies with the contractual terms. This serves as a counter measure to the
so-called “obsolescing bargain,”39 the typical trap built by the host state,
once the investment is being made.
Hostages and sequencing are mechanisms that operate completely
outside third-party enforcement. Important mechanisms that still work with-
out court intervention are reputational sanctions, and particularly, open
naming, blaming, and shaming40 of breaching parties. A further mechanism
to secure ongoing exchange is the introduction of outside monitors, such as
financial institutions and international or national investment insurance
schemes41 that might be relevant for the international standing and
creditworthiness of a state, or for the next investment. A closer look into the
complete set of contracts documenting large modern investments shows the
building of international alliances as security networks for bonding complex
transactions.42
Teaching a course about Complex Business Contracts would be in-
complete without resorting to these mechanisms derived from practice. Ad-
ditionally, I stress the relevance of creating value by observing state-of-the
negotiation theory as exposed, for example, in the text of Bob Mnookin and
his Harvard project,43 plus some newer insights from behavioral econom-
ics.44 But my main source of inspiration remains the study of mining agree-
ments and my later interest in the practice and theory of franchising.
VI. ACCOUNTING FOR CO-OPERATION
My final remarks return to Christian Kirchner’s contribution in our
contract study in the seventies and eighties, and its relation to research and
teaching today. Whereas I was concerned with “Forms of Agreement and
38. See Schanze, INVESTITIONSVERTR ¨AGE, supra note 29, at 175 for detail.
39. THEODORE H. MORAN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF DEPEN-
DENCE: COPPER IN CHILE (1975).
40. The concept was first presented by William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin
Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 631–54 (1980).
41. See Schanze, Regulation by Consensus, supra note 4, at 163–66.
42. Id. at 166–68.
43. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING, supra note 23.
44. MORAL SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION IN
ECONOMIC LIFE (Ernst Fehr et al. eds., 2005).
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the Joint Venture Practice,”45 Christian chose the mesmerizing topic of “In-
formation Disclosure” in mining agreements.46 The choice of topic alone
was a stroke of genius. It implied a deeper and, indeed, unexplored idea
about the functioning of economic long-term arrangements. As I understand
it today, when I teach Complex Business Contracts, Christian had an early
hunch that the daily practice of accounting for corporations or corporate
groups contained an elementary mechanism that would also be relevant for
complex long-term contracts between independent partners in economic
collaborations.
As one would expect from Christian, he engages in his chapter in a
highly structured and original analysis of the topic. He does not remain
within the accountant perspective, which basically offers a rule-based state-
ment of historical transactions assembled in the balance sheet and associ-
ated documents. Instead, he looks at the comprehensive information process
in our actor model.47 His approach not only includes the principal partici-
pants to the contract, investor and state, but also international organizations,
producers’ associations, and many other actors who are relevant to the deal.
For every single relationship, he first discusses the characteristics of the
relevant information instruments. Then he goes on to aspects of time, quan-
tity, and quality of the relevant information.48 This seemingly abstract and
almost repetitive discourse is illuminated by constant quotes of clauses used
in our large collection of mining contracts.
Christian’s analysis demonstrates that information sharing is funda-
mental for defining a fair claim to the proceeds of any business project, be it
an incorporated venture with risk bonding by shareholders, or be it joint
venture or another symbiotic relationship between independent business
partners.
The functioning of the global structure of production of our time de-
pends crucially on what I would term today, “accounting for co-operation.”
Let us heed this lesson from the strange field of mining agreements in de-
veloping countries. Accounting for co-operation offers a formidable pro-
gram for research and teaching, inspired by law and economics.
May I end here, confessing a secret? The best way to memorialize and
to pay tribute to the unusual scholar and teacher Christian Kirchner is to
read him closely. I strongly recommend reading the third chapter of Mining
Ventures in Developing Countries, Part 2: Analysis of Project
Agreements.49
45. Erich Schanze, Forms of Agreement and the Joint Venture Practice, in SCHANZE ET AL.,
MINING VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, Part 2, supra note 4, at 20–67.
46. Christian Kirchner, Information Disclosure, in SCHANZE ET AL., MINING VENTURES IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, Part 2, supra note 4, at 68–107.
47. Id. at 71–73.
48. Id. at 73–74.
49. Id. at 68–107.
